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Afghanistan in Transition
ALI A. JALALI

I

n December 2010, President Obama issued his review of the US strategy
in Afghanistan following the significant increase in military forces and a
renewed counterinsurgency effort. Nearly a year ago, the US Commander
in Chief decided to send an additional 30,000 US forces to Afghanistan as
part of a strategy to reverse the Taliban’s momentum and build the Afghan
government’s capacity, allowing the United States to begin drawing down
its forces in July 2011.1 The ensuing military surge, which raised the level
of the US-led International Security Assistant Force (ISAF) to over 140,000
(including 100,000 US service members), and a new population-centered
stabilization strategy may be the first serious counterinsurgency effort in
the nine-year war.
During the past nine years, poorly resourced and ill-coordinated
state building and stabilization efforts failed to check the growing insecurity
and violence that peaked this year at the highest level since the removal
of the Taliban from power in 2001. The ever-increasing complexity of the
strategic and operational environment has perplexed the Afghan government and contributing nations and stymied the development of any unified,
long-term vision for the nation and its people. All parties have approached
the emerging issues in divergent, uncoordinated ways, with operations on
every front being fragmented reactions to events rather than strategic undertakings designed to support long-term goals. An American warrior of the
Vietnam War famously once said that America had not been fighting the
war in Vietnam for 12 years, but for one year 12 times.2 The same can be
said in Afghanistan today where the international forces have fought nine,
one-year wars.
The December review came amid growing doubts over a war that
has dragged on for almost a decade with no clear prospects for winning. The
extension of Taliban influence into once stable areas in the West and North
of the country, rising casualties among US-NATO forces and Afghan civilians, the weakening of Afghan government control, and waivering belief in
President Karzai’s commitment to eliminate official corruption and improve
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governance have ebbed public support in America and NATO capitals to
its lowest level. These trends increasingly find reflection in policy-making
circles in the United States and the European nations that are providing forces.
There are calls for a major change in the US commitment in Afghanistan as
there are warnings that an unrealistic drawdown of international forces and
a minimalist approach will lead to greater instability in the region.
So the real challenge is how to deal with this conflict in a way that
averts an everlasting US-military entanglement and curbs transnational security threats emanating from the region. The mainstream strategic approach
includes building Afghanistan’s local capacity for security responsibilities
and shaping a strategic environment that is conducive to regional peace
and stability.
This article looks at the short-term prospects of a sustainable transition
of security responsibility under a renewed US-ISAF strategy and the transition’s long-term impact on peace and stability in and around Afghanistan.
Challenges and Opportunities
The main challenge facing Afghanistan is how to deal with a growing
insurgency while the government is weakening and its foreign support is
wavering. Responding to these challenges requires measures to lower the
threat level and Afghanistan’s capacity to respond to threats. These measures are directly linked. No amount of military power, foreign or domestic,
will gain much unless the Afghan government improves its capacity to
control its territory, win the trust of the people, and prevent infiltration
and subversion from abroad. The success of a US-led counterinsurgency
strategy in Afghanistan is closely linked to a partnership with an effective
Afghan government.
Afghanistan has made notable achievements in rebuilding its state
institutions, adopting a modern constitution, holding peaceful elections, creating national security institutions, improving women’s rights, and expanding
educational institutions. Yet the government and its international partners
failed to sustain and build on these accomplishments. They missed opportunities to establish long-term stability, opting instead for short-term deals
with non-state powers concerned only with their own interests. The result is a
weak government’s with incompetent security forces and a poor and corrupt
system of justice.
Weakness of state institutions is the principle cause of the government ineffectiveness and debility. Although President Karzai is the elected
leader of the country, he lacks the credible institutional and political muscle
to offset the influence of non-statuary power brokers. He does not have a
strong political base and has neither a political party nor a cohesive political
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team to govern. While President Karzai is an ethnic Pashtun, he does not
command tribal support of all Pashtuns; consequently, his policy of choice
is often accommodating the power
brokers in governance. Following
In Afghanistan...the
failures to invest sufficiently in
international
forces have
building state institutions combined
fought nine, one-year wars.
with the rise of insurgency since
2006 has caused the weak Afghan
government to rely increasingly on corruption-infested, non-state, patronage networks. The government opted to strike a balance between justice
and the exigencies of stability; therefore, the main actors on the Afghan
political scene include weak state institutions, strong insurgents, and
opportunistic, non-state powerbrokers. Even some US field commanders
in southern Afghanistan are adopting a strategy that increasingly places the
priority on fighting the Taliban even if that means tolerating some level of
corruption. Military officials in the region have concluded that the Taliban’s
insurgency is the most pressing threat to stability and a sweeping effort
to drive out corruption might create chaos and a governance vacuum the
Taliban could exploit.3
The current situation promotes corruption that permeates not only
the governance but also the political and economic sectors and has become
a major hurdle to achieving security and development. Insufficient investment and irresolute commitment to the establishment of the rule of law
has fostered a culture of impunity. Without rule of law, the political scene,
including the elections, became a playground for people with guns and
money inside and outside the government. Similarly the emerging free
market economy is dominated by different shades of mafia. The financial
turmoil faced by Afghanistan’s leading private bank (the Kabul Bank) in
September is a microcosm of graft-infested, private sector institutions. The
institutional problems that triggered a run on the bank were caused by word
leaking out that top directors and major shareholders of the financial institution made hundreds of millions of dollars in, often clandestine, loans to
themselves and Afghan government insiders.
The Afghan government’s weakness and its growing unpopularity are
widely exploited by the Taliban in an effort to win by means of discrediting
the Kabul regime and the regime’s foreign supporters. While insurgents may
suffer from indirect military encounters with the ISAF and Afghan military
forces, the insurgents have significantly enhanced their capacities. Thanks to
al Qaeda and other foreign supporters’ technical and logistical assistance, the
insurgents are expanding their use of more sophisticated improvised explosive device and suicide bombers.4 Disadvantaged by a garrison mentality and
limited mobility outside the wire, the attitude of government security posts
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provides freedom of action even for small groups of militants that roam
the villages and influence the unprotected population. The Taliban do not
have to occupy space to control it. The fear of their brutal actions control
the population’s behavior. The militants have also intensified their intimidation campaign with targeted assassinations of influential political, tribal,
and religious leaders, who could be instrumental in expanding the writ of
the government in rural areas, thereby contributing to peace and stability.
The parliamentary election in September clearly proved that despite the
insurgents’ threats and widespread attempts to disrupt the polls, they were
unable to halt the election process. Taliban strength comes mainly from the
government’s weakness and passivity.
Although more than 70 percent of civilian deaths are caused by the
Taliban attacks, the insurgents highlight and magnify incidents of civilian
casualties caused by NATO military operations, stoking public resentment,
which is often expressed in protests and demonstrations.5 The Taliban also
coerce people into identifying militants killed in NATO bombings as civilian casualties.6 Through a systematic strategic communication program, the
insurgents try to convince people that NATO is losing the fight and will soon
redeploy, leaving the Taliban as the only formidable force in the country.
Some of the Taliban’s recent successes in the North and West are thought to
be a direct result of this misinformation offensive.
The US strategy will have a decisive impact on any prospects
for success in short-term transition as well as the long-term stability in
Afghanistan. President Obama’s December review examined the need for
the continuation or adjustment of the counterinsurgency strategy, directly
impacting the pace and level of the impending drawdown. Regardless of
any announced intention and pace of the July 2011 drawdown, the deadline
has become part of the strategic calculus for America’s allies, the Afghan
government and people, the Taliban, Afghanistan’s neighbors, and other
regional actors. In a committed strategic effort, force drawdown is dictated
by operational realities. Imposing time constraints on operations in an
uncertain, dynamic environment sends messages of impending weakness.
The perception of waning international resolve has boosted insurgents’ confidence that they can win and provides little incentive for them to support
any peace talks. It has lowered the morale of the population that does not
support the Taliban’s return to power, causing many to reconsider casting
their lot with the eventual winner. This perception also drives regional actors
toward a hedging strategy and it impedes any hope of effective cooperation
in stabilizing Afghanistan.
There are, however, emerging opportunities to respond to these
ongoing challenges. Now is the first time in the post-Taliban period that
sufficient resources are available and there is a sound strategy the US-led
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NATO forces have adopted not only to stem the growth of the insurgency
but also to build the Afghan government’s capacity to take ownership and
leadership of state building and stabilization operations.7 This strategy
argues for a measured drawdown of US forces this summer and the compelling need to give the strategy sufficient time to accomplish tangible results.8
The new strategy already demonstrated its ability to weaken the insurgents
in Helmand, Kandahar, and parts of greater Paktiya provinces.9
During the Kabul International Conference on July 20, 2010, the
Afghan government pledged to implement a new “whole of the state” and
“whole of government” approach to national renewal. The essence of the
“whole of the state” approach is constitutionalism—to strengthen each of
the three branches of the government and reinforce the constitutional checks
and balances that guarantee and enforce citizen rights and obligations. The
essence of the “whole of government” approach is structural reform—to
create an effective, accountable, and transparent government that can deliver
services to the population and safeguard national interests. Together, these
complementary approaches, by putting people at the core, are the key to
stability and prosperity.10 Progress in these processes depends on creating
opportunities for success by pursuing current military operations for a few
more years. Unless such a continuation of the strategy occurs, no government initiatives will succeed and the lives of the citizenry will be negatively
impacted. It is only through successful governance that the international
community and Afghan government can achieve their ultimate counterinsurgency goal—to make the Taliban and their allies irrelevant.
Alternative Strategies
There is increasing domestic pressure by various factions in the
United States and other NATO countries for drastic changes to the current
US strategy, but these groups offer no credible alternative. There really is
not any strong justification for giving up the current counterinsurgency strategy that was earnestly implemented less than a year ago and just recently
allocated sufficient resources. The growing perception among the Afghan
people, however, is that ISAF is losing the war, a perception that undermines
the US counterinsurgency effort even before it is given time to succeed.
Some have suggested alternative, minimalist approaches that are, in fact,
defeat in disguise and merely an attempt to put a good face on failure. Other
groups and factions tend to oversimplify the political-strategic challenge in
an attempt to justify overly simplistic solutions.
In August, a report by the so-called Afghan Study Group led by
Matthew Hoh, the Marine officer who resigned from the State Department
in protest of Obama’s policies last year, called on the president to bring a
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majority of US forces home, abandoning any attempt to defeat the Taliban.11
The report stressed that al Qaeda, the main target of US military intervention, is no longer a significant presence in Afghanistan. Based on various
twisted interpretations of history and inconsistency of argument, the report
claims that American interests in Afghanistan do not warrant the current
level of sacrifice. The Afghanistan Study Group fails to propose a means for
ending the war, suggesting instead that any drawdown of US forces would
also be accompanied by a plan that tens of thousands of American forces
would remain in Afghanistan for years.
A report by the London-based International Institute for Strategic
Studies (IISS) suggests that Western powers should modify their strategy to
focus on “containment and deterrence” of al Qaeda and the Taliban instead
of placing extraordinary efforts on failed attempts at nation-building.12
Conceptually, containment and deterrence can hardly work against enemies
who are transnational, have no specific geographic boundaries, and practice
unconventional and asymmetrical methods of warfare. The “disrupting,
dismantling, and defeating [of] al Qaeda” in the region and preventing its
return, as outlined in current US policy, require building a viable government in Afghanistan, one capable of controlling its territory.13 Only by
building a stable government can we expect to achieve the eradication of
violence and terrorism, and ensure that these gains are capable of being sustained. Given the lessons of the recent past when the United States focused
solely on a counterterrorism strategy following the removal of Taliban, any
minimalist approach or scaled-down commitment would simply prolong the
violence and eventually fail, leading to serious consequences for regional
stability and international security. The IISS-suggested strategy has been
vehemently disputed by another credible UK-based institution, the Henry
Jackson Society. This institution believes that the conflict in Afghanistan
“can and must be won,” and that can only be accomplished through the
continuation of a strong counterinsurgency strategy.14
Some of the arguments that underpin a minimalist approach contradict ground realities. For example, some suggest that al Qaeda, the main
reason for America’s invasion, is no longer in Afghanistan. They espouse a
belief that the presence of foreign soldiers is resented by the population, a
resentment giving the Taliban reason to continue fighting; they also believe
there is no solution to the continuing conflict. These individuals and groups
take the usual clichés out of context and use them to justify a number of
misconceptions. These include: Afghanistan is the graveyard of empires;
efforts to centralize power in Afghanistan provoke local resistance; and
Afghanistan is an ethnically fragmented and decentralized country incapable of forming a unified state.
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The realities within Afghanistan provide a radically different picture.
There may, in fact, be a limited number of al Qaeda fighters in Afghanistan
today, but their influence has significantly increased due to improved
political, technical, psychological, and transnational logistical support.
Qualitatively, al Qaeda is more efficient and effective in its support to the
various insurgent groups, even more successful than in the 1990s when the
terrorist network was based in Afghanistan. Despite public resentment of
collateral damages and the loss of life caused by military operations, there
is still enormous support for the presence of American and NATO forces
in Afghanistan.15 It is probably true that there is no military solution to this
conflict; however, the fact remains that this war can be lost through lack of
military effort.
There are also calls for the decentralization of power and weakening
of the central government, ceding parts of the country to Taliban forces
under a peace agreement. Such a plan would, in fact, look like a de facto
balkanization of the country. While all these foreign-based plans and suggestions are sincere attempts at resolving the main issues underlying the
conflict, they only address the symptoms of the instability and fail to deal
with the root causes. Unfortunately, during the past three decades, imposition of solutions by outsiders have not only brought instability but also
frustrated the traditional political dynamics in Afghanistan, that of keeping
the multi-ethnic nation together under a state possessing the power to maintain equilibrium and exercise compromises.
Historically, Afghanistan has been a strong nation and a weak state.
The central government was traditionally weak, but the peripheries were
even weaker, favoring the presence of a central authority as a power balancer and political arbitrator. Despite its ethnic diversity, the Afghan nation
has shown surprising strength, resilience, and viability in the recent past,
with no trace of secessionist threats. For most of the last century, relative
peace coupled with foreign assistance has helped Afghanistan to establish
modern state institutions and economic infrastructure, both of which facilitated national integration and expanded the writ of the central government
throughout the country. Kabul’s lack of capacity and resources has hindered
its ability to respond effectively to the periphery’s needs for services and has
left the more traditional power structures and informal conflict resolution
institutions intact. Kabul often supplements these formal institutions with
resources without directly competing with them. These informal structures
are particularly active in the tribal areas. The country’s nationhood is based
more on what Ernest Renan terms a “will” to persist together rather than on
common ethnicity, language, or tribal affiliation. In terms of ethnic affiliation, tribal divisions, clan networks, social divisions, and regional solidarity,
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the Afghan society is mostly atomized. Paradoxically, it is this atomization
that guards against disintegration and compartmentalization.
Obviously, the breakdown of central authority during three decades
of conflict stimulated a sociopolitical transformation that vitalized regional
patronage networks under the leadership of regional commanders, many of
whom invoked ethnic ties to legitimize their leadership. This situation, in the
absence of a strong central government, fueled ethno-regional competition
for power and resources. Long-term stability in Afghanistan is dependent
on the central government’s ability to manage this divisive situation rather
than adopting solutions that only accommodate existing fragmentation.
Accommodation of traditional power structures and ethnic groups has to
be sought through democratic participation, political and economic integration, and the development of society and the private sector in such a manner
as to mitigate the negative impacts of competing group interests.
The Strategy of Transition
A new roadmap for Afghanistan was adopted by the London
International Conference in January 2010, the highlights of which
include transitioning security responsibility to Afghan control, significant
institutional enhancement of Afghanistan’s national security capacity, and
supporting the Afghan government’s national reconciliation plan.16 The
meeting launched a process known as the Kabul Process, which is Afghanled and aimed at accelerating Afghanistan’s ability to govern itself, reducing
Afghan’s dependence on the international community, enhancing its security
forces, and providing better protection for the rights of all its citizens. The
process, which also included convening the National Consultative Peace
Jirga in June 2010, culminated in the Kabul International Conference in July
where the Afghan government outlined the details of the transition under
Afghan leadership.17 The Kabul Conference endorsed a new, three-year
Prioritization and Implementation Plan that builds on the 2008 Afghanistan
National Development Strategy. The new plan establishes Afghan national
priorities in five critical areas: security, governance and the rule of law,
economic and social development, reconciliation and reintegration, and
regional cooperation.
The success of such an Afghanization strategy depends on resources,
sound Afghan leadership, coordinated international partnership, and, most
importantly, time. The Kabul Process is built on deep and broad international
partnerships and long-term international support as Afghanistan continues
to develop its indigenous capacity for a responsible and sustainable transition. Given the local and regional political and security dynamics, the
transition process is going to be multi-dimensional, complex, and nonlinear.
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It requires an integrated approach that combines the military strategy with
political and developmental strategies. A political strategy of negotiation
should not be seen as an alternative approach but rather as a complementing
effort. There is an ongoing debate regarding the development of a strategy based on whether negotiating with the Taliban should be adopted as
the political policy supported by a military strategy (as preferred by the
Europeans) or should the emphasis be on a military strategy of choice that
forces the Taliban to the negotiating table (the strategy supported by US
military commanders). In the first strategy, the pace of troop withdrawal
will be determined by the progress in negotiations with the Taliban. In the
latter case, the pace of progress in talks will be determined by the progress
on the battlefield.
These two strategies should not be viewed as mutually exclusive.
It is clear, however, that as long as withdrawal is the centerpiece of any
strategic approach, the Taliban and its supporters are not going to have any
incentive to negotiate. Meanwhile, without taking advantage of military
gains to establish conditions for negotiations, peace will remain elusive.
Historically, negotiated ends of insurgencies have all taken an extended
amount of time and were conducted in concert with actions on the battlefield. So, in either strategy, negotiations and fighting are likely to go on
simultaneously for an extended time and until an environment conducive to
a sustainable settlement is achieved.
Transition Mechanisms
The Kabul Conference endorsed the Afghan government’s plan,
developed in concert with NATO, based on mutually-agreed criteria and
the phased transition to full Afghan responsibility for security, as outlined
in the technical transition paper. It further endorsed a decision-making
process of the Government of Afghanistan (GOA) and the North Atlantic
Council (NAC). The GOA and NATO/ISAF jointly assessed the provinces
with the aim of announcing by the end of 2010 the process of transition was
underway.18 President Karzai made a commitment that the Afghan National
Security Forces (ANSF) “should lead and conduct military operations in all
provinces by the end of 2014.” This entire process is predicated on assistance from the international community in an effort to help Afghanistan
generate security forces capable of assuming this responsibility.
The effective and sustainable transition of security requires creating
security, governance, and developmental capacities, and shaping the local
and regional environment to reduce threat levels, win the trust of the population, and facilitate and promote regional cooperation. The main obstacles to
achieving this transition are a growing insurgency, weak state institutions,
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ineffective and corrupt governance, difficulties in expanding the quantity
and quality of Afghan security forces, and the diverging strategic interests
of Afghanistan’s neighbors. Building the capacity of ANSF requires three
key elements:
• Professional and institutional capability.
• Capacity to function in an unstable and insurgent environment.
• Simultaneous development of other government institutions.
Following President Obama’s December 2009 speech on Afghanistan
strategy, the NATO Training Mission (NTM-A) and Combined Security
Transition Command (CSTC-A) in Afghanistan set the priorities to accelerate growth of the Afghan National Army (ANA) to 134,000 by October
2010, along with the reform and expansion of the Afghan National Police
(ANP) to 109,000. Future plans call for expanding the ANA to 171,600 and
ANP to 134,000 by October 2011. The expansion target for 2013 is 240,000
for the ANA and 160,000 for the ANP. Total ANSF strength in December
2009 was 191,969 and is programmed for an increase to 305,600 by October
2011 and 400,000 by 2013.
The ANA reached its targeted strength for 2010 ahead of schedule.
It is expected that ANSF will meet the future deadlines in term of numbers,
but it is unclear whether the numerical increase will be matched in terms of
effectiveness. According to LTG William B. Caldwell, the head of NTM-A,
desertion is a major problem. In order to add 56,000 more individuals to the
force by next fall, some 141,000 individuals will have to be recruited and
trained.19 But, there is no accurate estimate on when Kabul might assume
control in even the more peaceful parts of the country. President Barack
Obama expects US forces will begin redeploying in July 2011, with conditions on the ground determining how many forces can leave and how fast.
Marine Corps Commandant General James Conway recently said that transition of security responsibility to Afghan forces, particularly in the south,
will take several years.20
While the capacity to provide mentors and partnership with Afghan
forces has significantly improved, the real challenge is building the capabilities of the army and police within the time constraints. Planned expansion
of ANSF requires provision of added training facilities, funds, and trainers,
as well as imaginative leadership at every level. Meeting these requirements
in proportion to the planned increase of ANA to 240,000 by 2013 requires
the mobilization of enormous resources that are unlikely to occur within the
announced timeframe. Meanwhile, the political process needs to maintain
the capacity to deal with a wide range of obstacles, including budgetary
constraints, pay and benefit costs, ethnic, tribal and corruption issues, and
Taliban infiltration.
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The development of the ANP faces more serious challenges than the
ANA. In the Afghan environment, the ANP is expected to perform a variety
of counterinsurgency, security, law enforcement, border protection, counterterrorism, and counternarcotics missions. Further, police performance is
closely linked to the effectiveness of governance and justice sector. Most of
the ANP lack the capacity to support counterinsurgency operations where
protection of local population is a key element.
In order to boost the capacity for security, the ISAF and Afghanistan
government decided to create an up-to-10,000-strong Afghan Local Police
(ALP) force for securing public installations, preventing armed opposition
infiltration, and providing favorable space for governance and development.
Raised locally in threatened areas, the ALP is a security force that only
performs guard duties and does not conduct law enforcement activities. The
initiative entails opportunities and risks. If properly selected and closely
controlled, the village guards will help; otherwise, the program could add
to problems caused by existing, illegally armed groups. There are a number
of safeguards in place. The police officers are recruited, trained, paid, and
controlled by provincial and district police departments in close consultation with and vetted by local shuras. They serve where they live and use
their weapons to defend the local populace.21
No credible military capacity can be developed in a vacuum.
Legitimate security forces are created by a state whose citizens view it as
legitimate and worth fighting for. Building security capacities is not simply
an exercise of generating more and more army (Kandaks) or police units. It
requires the security forces to be developed in the context of an integrated
civil-military, institution-building effort. The development of the Afghan
National Army and National Police without regard to the other weaknesses
in the Afghan government, such as the rule of law, corruption, and the influence of non-state power brokers, will seriously undermine the effectiveness
of the force no matter how numerically strong it may be. Efforts should
be focused on consolidating various institutions in an attempt to curb the
influence of power brokers; otherwise, government and civil institutions
will continue to serve the personal and group interests of non-state actors.
Reintegration and Reconciliation
The Kabul Conference “welcomed and endorsed in principle the
Afghan government’s Peace and Reintegration Program (APRP), which is
open to all Afghan members of the armed opposition and their communities
who renounce violence, have no links to international terrorist organizations, respect the constitution, and are willing to join in building a peaceful
Afghanistan.”22 The international community reiterated its commitment
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to support this endeavor through the Peace and Reintegration Trust Fund.
Kabul’s reintegration and reconciliation initiative is based on principles
endorsed by a 1,600-member National Consultative Peace Jirga that met
in Kabul in June 2010 and unanimously called for resolution of the
ongoing conflict through negotiations with the armed opposition.23 The
Taliban leadership has, so far, either rejected calls for reconciliation or
added conditions that the Afghan government and its international partners deem unacceptable.
Ideas that are under consideration regarding the APRP look at tactical level reintegration efforts focused on the foot soldiers and local leaders
who form the bulk of the insurgency. Efforts at the strategic level focus
on the Taliban and insurgents’ leadership. By necessity, this is a complex
and highly sensitive process necessitating a broad approach. The program
for this level may include: the problems of sanctuaries, measures for outreach and removal from the UN sanction list, ensuring that individuals
and organizations break links to al Qaeda, and the securement of political
accommodation or exile in a third country.
The goal of the APRP is to promote peace through the political
process. It encourages regional and international cooperation, sets political
and judicial conditions for peace and reconciliation, and encourages combatant soldiers, commanders, and leaders, who previously sided with the
opposition, to renounce violence and terrorism and join in a constructive
process of reintegration and peace. There are certain obstacles in the way
of integration that may influence the results even as the process continues.
These obstacles include the trust deficit and the diverse motivations that
drive individuals to fight (ideological, political, social, personal, and economic). In the absence of security and trusted governance, the process’s
potential for failure could be influenced by a collapse of compact, local
rivalries, increased corruption, and loss of credibility.
Negotiation with the insurgents is simply a means to an end. Hopefully,
the end is a peace settlement supported by all parties, a settlement that is
sustainable and will not sow the seeds for renewed conflict. Any settlement
needs to address grievances that fueled the insurgency, such as corruption,
injustice, political exclusion, and marginalization. Such an accord is not
just about a deal with the Taliban or Pakistan. The settlement should clearly
define an end state that Afghans are willing to support. Covert talks with the
Taliban could alienate a goodly portion of the country’s leadership and be
extremely divisive. It may simply be a futile attempt, as the insurgents have
not indicated they are ready to talk. The lack of public trust in the Kabul
government and deepening suspicions among the Afghan political forces
require multi-level negotiations that are a part of any peace talk strategy.
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Afghanistan’s neighbors and other regional powers can be obstacles or solutions to the country’s problems. Progress requires stability in
Afghanistan as an extension of the strategic priorities of other nations.
Regional interference and intervention in Afghanistan will continue as long
as the country remains unstable and the prospect for stability is elusive. The
presence of insurgents’ safe havens in Pakistan is one of the obstacles to
progress. Attaining a level of stability should convince insurgents’ foreign
supporters that the situation has reached beyond a “stalemate” and is in
the process of facilitating regional cooperation to stabilize Afghanistan. No
regional approach, however, can be fully effective without the efforts of
other major powers (NATO, the United States, China, India, and Russia)
involved in the region.
Conclusion
Sustainable stability based on democratic principles is a prerequisite for regional stability and Afghanistan’s political future. This requires
a long-term commitment. But a long-term, state-building process can be
hindered by short-term political agendas, perilous short-cuts, and militarization of development. Reconciliation, reintegration, and development of
the Afghanistan government’s capacity to assume security responsibilities
are all elements of a sound and rational transition strategy. Now is the
first time in the post-Taliban period that sufficient resources are available,
and that US-led NATO forces have adopted a strategy that not only stems
the growth of the insurgency but also builds the Afghan government’s
capacity to assume ownership and leadership of all the state-building and
stabilization operations. There is a compelling need to provide sufficient
time for the strategy to accomplish tangible results, including the measured
drawdown of US forces in 2011. The success of the American counterinsurgency strategy is closely linked to a partnership with a stable and effective
Afghan government.
To improve government effectiveness in the short-term, there is a
critical need to enhance the president’s office by establishing a decisionmaking capability with the power to delegate authority to other capable
governmental bodies. We need to ensure, however, that too much authority
is not placed in the president’s office, especially if there is an absence of
bureaucratic capacity to exercise it effectively and efficiently. This retention of authority can undermine leadership as well as reduce the planning
and exercise of strategic guidance. Such a centralization of power makes
the high-level, decision-making process extremely slow and convoluted,
tailored to individual needs, arbitrary, injudicious, and incapable of
orchestrating governmental operations. Reforming the system requires the
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establishment of strong strategic planning bodies in the form of high councils
for national security, governance, and economic affairs with the capacity to
plan, coordinate, and lead the implementation of strategy and any associated
programs. This strategy needs to encompass all the components associated
with stability operations (security, governance, rule of law, and economic
development). The councils should also be capable of coordinating strategic
issues with international stakeholders in and outside of Afghanistan.
In the interest of fostering a viable political process, the political
landscape should be opened to promote the emergence of nation-wide
political parties. These parties could focus on a national agenda to offset
the patronage networks that have emerged from the civil war and ethnic
alignments presently dominating the political scene. The opening of the
political process will help sustain the gains that have been made to this
point, support the emergence of young leaders, and ensure greater participation and political representation by a range of previously excluded political
actors, economic and business elites, and the disenfranchised from various
tribal and ethnic groups.
NOTES
1. President Barack Obama, “Obama’s Address on the War in Afghanistan” (address, US Military
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in the jungle.
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